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Abstract: Low power over wireless personal area networks (LoWPAN), in particular 
wireless sensor networks, represent an emerging technology with high potential to be 
employed in critical situations like security surveillance, battlefields, smart-grids, and in  
e-health applications. The support of security services in LoWPAN is considered a 
challenge. First, this type of networks is usually deployed in unattended environments, 
making them vulnerable to security attacks. Second, the constraints inherent to LoWPAN, 
such as scarce resources and limited battery capacity, impose a careful planning on how 
and where the security services should be deployed. Besides protecting the network from 
some well-known threats, it is important that security mechanisms be able to withstand 
attacks that have not been identified before. One way of reaching this goal is to control, at 
the network access level, which nodes can be attached to the network and to enforce their 
security compliance. This paper presents a network access security framework that can be 
used to control the nodes that have access to the network, based on administrative 
approval, and to enforce security compliance to the authorized nodes.  
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List of Acronyms 
6LN  6LoWPAN Node 
6LR  6LoWPAN Router 
6LBR  6LoWPAN Border Router 
AES  Advanced encryption standard 
CGA  Cryptographically generated addresses 
DAD  Duplicate Address Detection 
DAG  Directed Acyclic Graph 
DAR  Duplicate Address Request 
DODAG Destination Oriented DAG 
ECC  Elliptic curve cryptography  
LSEND Lightweight Secure Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy 
MAC  Medium Access Control sub-layer protocol 
MTU  Maximum Transmission Unit 
NA  Neighbor advertisement 
NDP  Neighbor discovery protocol 
NS  Neighbor solicitation 
PHY  Physical layer protocol 
RA  Router advertisement 
RPL  IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy networks 
RS  Router solicitation 
SEND  Secure neighbor discovery protocol 
1. Introduction 
Low power wireless personal area networks (LoWPAN) [1] comprise devices compliant with the 
IEEE 802.15.4 [2] standard and are widely used in embedded applications such as environmental 
monitoring, smart-grids, surveillance, industrial and home automation. These applications often 
require a large number of small devices to cover large areas and must operate unattended for years 
equipped with small batteries. Many of the IEEE 802.15.4 compliant devices are characterized by 
small size, power constraints, small computing and storage resources and by reduced radio ranges and 
throughput. Self-organization, fault-tolerance, and self-optimization are the main characteristics of 
LoWPAN networks [2].  
Initially, the IP protocol stack was considered too complex to be supported by IEEE 802.15.4 
devices. Meanwhile, the scientific community, together with the industry, started to rethink many of 
the misconceptions about the use of IP protocol stacks in resource-constrained devices [3]. Now, the 
IPv6 protocol is the most consensual solution to connect LoWPAN networks to the Internet facilitating 
the design and deployment of applications [4]. However, IPv6 was not designed to be used in such 
devices and, therefore, an adaptation layer was introduced between the link layer and the network 
layer. This adaptation layer, proposed by IETF 6LoWPAN Working Group [1], enables the 
transmission of IPv6 datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4 links by providing header compression (to reduce 
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overhead), fragmentation (to support the IPv6 minimum MTU requirement) and support for layer-two 
forwarding (to deliver IPv6 datagram over multiple radio hops). Although the standard IPv6 neighbor 
discovery protocol [5] might work on 6LoWPAN networks, it exhibits high overhead and includes no 
security support. The lightweight secure neighbor discovery optimizations for 6LoWPAN protocol  
(the LSEND protocol) [6,7] was proposed to circumvent these problems.  
LoWPAN networks exhibit a large number of vulnerabilities, which make them even more prone to 
security attacks [8–12] than traditional IP networks. In fact, a single LoWPAN network can scale up to 
thousands of nodes without any fixed infrastructure and these nodes are often installed in harsh and 
unattended environments. Moreover, the addition of new nodes makes the network topology dynamic 
and complex to manage. Several security mechanisms have been proposed, some of them defined to 
address some particular well-known attacks [13]. Besides protecting the network from well-known 
attacks, it is also important that security mechanisms be able to withstand attacks that have not been 
identified before [14]. If a malicious node is prevented from becoming attached to the network, it 
cannot communicate with any network element and, therefore, it cannot launch any type of security 
attack. Therefore, one way of reaching this goal is to control, at the network access level, which nodes 
can be attached to the network and to enforce their security compliance. Besides the security 
advantages, such methodology also makes the network more manageable, while increasing its 
reliability and extending its lifetime [15]. 
This paper proposes a network access control security framework for 6LoWPAN networks, that 
controls the access of nodes to the network, based on administrative authorization, and enforces 
security compliance to the authorized nodes. The proposed framework makes use of LSEND protocol 
(for secure neighbor discovery and key pairwise generation), RPL (for datagram routing), and Seluge 
(for security compliant code dissemination). Unlike other access control mechanisms, this proposal 
includes an automatic remediation mechanism to enable nodes to become security compliant, if 
necessary, in order to have their access granted by the network.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 addresses the security support 
requirements for LoWPAN networks and reviews the current solutions. Section 3 focuses on the 
technologies and protocols used to support the proposed network access control security framework. 
The Sections 4 and 5 present the proposed network access control design framework and discuss its 
application and the requirements for its implementation. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and 
identifies future research topics. 
2. Security on LoWPAN Networks 
Note that both LoWPAN networks and general resource unconstrained networks share almost the 
same security requirements [12,16]. However, due to the node resource constraints, the number of 
nodes and the absence of an organized communication infrastructure, supporting security services in 
LoWPAN networks is more challenging when compared with resource unconstrained networks. 
Confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, availability, data freshness, robustness, and survivability are the 
most relevant security requirements in LoWPAN networks [17,18]. Confidentiality ensures that only 
legitimate entities have access to the data transmitted and stored in the network nodes. Authenticity 
ensures that data is actually provided by its source nodes. Integrity guarantees that no data is changed 
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by any other entity, without being detected. Availability ensures that services provision is always 
available to their legitimate users. Data freshness prevents other entities from replaying old messages. 
Network robustness and survivability guarantees that the network still works properly even in the 
presence of intrusions, attacks, accidents and failures.  
Following [19], LoWPAN security attacks can be broadly classified as external versus internal 
attacks, passive versus active attacks and mote-class versus laptop-class attacks. In external attacks, the 
attacker device can only use its own resources to perform the attack and has no access to the resources 
of the other LoWPAN nodes. External attacks can be prevented with cryptography. For example, a 
cryptographic mechanism used to support authentication and confidentiality prevents an external 
attacker from eavesdropping third-party messages or injecting false messages. In internal attacks, the 
attacker device is able to compromise legitimate nodes by using their resources to perform the attacks. 
Internal attacks involve either the injection of malicious code into target nodes (exploiting flaws in the 
application modules) and/or the access of key material code and data of the target nodes. This type of 
attack enables the attacker to appear as a legitimate node in the network gaining the trust of the other 
legitimate nodes. Internal attacks are much harder to detect when compared with external attacks [20].  
Passive attacks are based on information gathering without modification. Eavesdropping and 
monitoring are examples of passive attacks. The active attacks involve modifications on the legitimate 
data stream or false data injection. In the mote-class attacks, nodes with similar resources as the 
legitimate nodes are used to perform the attack. In laptop-class attacks, an attacker uses devices with 
more resources, such as laptops, to perform the attack. Laptop-class attacks are especially effective, for 
example, to jam the wireless channel.  
Security attacks against LoWPAN networks can also be classified, according to security 
requirements, in the following three main groups [16]: attacks against secrecy and authenticity,  
attacks against network availability, and stealthy attacks (i.e., attacks against service integrity). 
Eavesdropping, packet replay, tampering and spoofing are examples of attacks against the secrecy and 
authenticity. Denial of service (DoS) is the main example of an attack against the network availability 
and can be targeted at the different layers of the networking stack [9,10]. In the stealthy attacks, the 
main goal is to make a legitimate node to accept false data values generated by the attacker and, in this 
way, the compromised legitimate node can also be used to amplify the dissemination of false data 
through all other legitimate nodes. Several mechanisms, most of them based on cryptography, can be 
used to address these different requirements in LoWPAN networks. Currently, the research on 
providing security solutions for LoWPAN networks has been focused mainly in three categories:  
(i) key management, (ii) authentication and secure routing and (iii) secure services. Some solutions 
were proposed to establish and manage cryptographic keys between nodes to enable authentication and 
encryption mechanisms [21] while others have been proposed to protect routing protocols [22]. 
Progress has been achieved on specialized secure services, such as secure localization, secure data 
aggregation and secure time synchronization [23,24].  
There are also many proposals of security mechanisms addressing only particular attacks or used in 
particular layers as security tools. However, the major disadvantage with single layer security 
approaches is that security mechanisms are introduced on each layer, which in most of the cases tends 
to overall solutions with waste of resources power and exaggerated delays on message forwarding. 
Recently, researchers are pursuing security-integrated systems instead of concentrating on particular 
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attacks or layered based mechanisms. Some frameworks have been proposed to address simultaneously 
more than one security attack or to mitigate attacks using more than one security mechanism [25]. The 
most significant proposal is Security Protocols for Sensor Networks (SPINS) [26] which is composed 
by the Secure Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) and micro-TESLA. SNEP provides data 
confidentiality and two-way data authentication with reduced overhead while micro-TESLA is a 
lightweight version of Time Efficient Streamed Loss-tolerant Authentication (TESLA) providing 
authenticated streaming broadcast.  
SPINS does not cover, though, some relevant security issues, such as compromised nodes detection, 
DoS attacks or network and traffic analysis issues. Moreover, SPINS assumes a static network 
topology ignoring the ad hoc and mobile nature of LoWPAN networks. In [27], the authors propose a 
framework to provide secure cluster formation, security key management scheme and secure routing. It 
includes three components: a security mechanism to provide secrecy for communications in LoWPAN, 
an efficient session key distribution mechanism and a centralized key revocation scheme. The 
proposed framework does not depend on a specific key mechanism scheme and can be used to support 
many security applications, such as secure group communications.  
Currently, the control of the access to the network is considered a critical security service in 
LoWPAN networks because it can be used to prevent malicious nodes from joining the network and 
launching internal attacks [15]. With such service, only eligible nodes can access the network, while 
queries from external attacker nodes are not answered or forwarded by regular nodes. In defining the 
recently proposed access control schemes, three main aspects can be distinguished: new node addition, 
authenticated querying and user authentication [14]. Query authentication schemes guarantee data 
origin authentication and data integrity while user authentication schemes are the basic solution used 
for the access control issue. New node addition schemes use mechanisms based on Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) [28] to prevent malicious nodes from joining the network. Most of the secure 
network access systems provide node authentication and packet authentication, integrity verification 
and confidentiality. In [29], a self-certified elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) cryptosystem is used 
to establish a pairwise key between a new sensor node and a required Certificate Authority (CA) 
element, which can be implemented on regular nodes or on more powerful nodes such the border 
routers. The CA launches a two-way authentication procedure with the new node and establishes a 
pairwise key using the self-certified ECDH based protocol. The ECDH is used to guarantee nodes 
identification and to deliver a shared key to the new node. The shared key is the same for all nodes and 
is used to guarantee packet privacy and integrity. Note that the security of this scheme depends 
strongly on the secrecy of the shared key, i.e., it fails if a single node is compromised. 
To the best of our knowledge, though, none of the existing security frameworks includes the 
following important aspects which are dealt with by this proposal: to enable the node security 
compliance evaluation and enforcement (mitigating the security threats of internal attacks) and to use 
the same key pairwise for node authentication and routing protocol security. 
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3. Related Technologies 
3.1. 6LoWPAN 
Supporting IPv6 on sensor nodes simplifies simultaneously the task of connecting LoWPAN 
devices to the Internet and the application developing process. Currently, the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol 
is widely accepted as the PHY and MAC layer protocol for LoWPAN networks. Nevertheless, the 
network layer protocol must comply with the constraints imposed by the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol and 
the properties of the standard IPv6 protocol do not fully match with such constraints. Low bandwidth, 
low-power resources and the maximum packet size of 127 bytes are the most relevant characteristics of 
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, which must be dealt with in proper protocol adaptation. Moreover, the 
support of standard IPv6 headers over LoWPAN would result in extremely small payloads for higher 
layer protocols. Besides LoWPAN requirements, it is also necessary to guarantee that 6LoWPAN is 
compliant with the IPv6 minimum MTU of 1280 bytes and, consequently, fragmentation and 
reassembly is required. 
The IETF created the 6LoWPAN working group to define how to support IPv6 over IEEE 802.15.4 
protocol. The 6LoWPAN working group was focused on the following issues [1]: (i) to define a 
neighbor discovery protocol fitted for low-power networks, (ii) to describe mechanisms allowing 
compression of 6LoWPAN headers in order to reduce the header overhead and (iii) to define the 
6LoWPAN routing requirements and approaches. Two RFCs were released, the RFC 4919 [1] and the 
RFC 4944 [30]. The first document describes the assumptions, problem statement, and goals of 
6LoWPAN. The second document proposes a 6LoWPAN adaptation layer (between IPv6 and IEEE 
802.15.4) describing the frame format for transmission of IPv6 packets, the method for defining IPv6 
link-local addresses and stateless auto configured addresses, the header compression and the frame 
delivery process in IEEE 802.15.4 mesh networks.  
Rather than defining a single header (like IPv4), the 6LoWPAN uses stacked headers as the original 
IPv6 protocol does. The 6LoWPAN standard defines four header types: the dispatch header, the IPv6 
compression header, the fragmentation header and the mesh header (by default, only the dispatch and 
compression headers are used). At the beginning of each header, a header type field identifies the 
header format. 
An illustrated in Figure 1, a typical LoWPAN [31] consists of nodes (named 6LN or 6LoWPAN 
Nodes), routers (named 6LR or 6LoWPAN Routers) and border routers (named 6LBR or 6LoWPAN 
Border Routers). 
Nodes (or 6LNs) usually do sensing and actuation operations but they do not forward datagrams 
form other nodes to their destination nodes. Routers (or 6LRs) are intermediate nodes that forward 
datagram from others nodes (or routers) to their destination nodes in the same LoWPAN and are 
present only in route-over topologies. Border routers (or 6LBRs) are the interconnection devices 
between the LoWPAN network and others networks as, for example, the Internet. Typically, nodes and 
routers have energy and computational resource constraints while border routers are mainly powered 
with much more computational resources. 
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Figure 1. 6LoWPAN network architecture. 
 
3.2. Lightweight Secure Neighbor Discovery for 6LoWPAN (LSEND) 
In traditional IPv6 networks, both nodes and routers use the neighbor discovery protocol [5] and  
the stateless address autoconfiguration [32], which, together, are referred to as the neighbor  
discovery protocols (NDP). These protocols enable the following functions: (i) learning prefixes and 
configuration parameters related to address configuration, (ii) locating neighborhood routers,  
(iii) maintaining reachability information on active neighbors and (iv) detecting duplicate addresses. 
Note that NDP was proposed for unconstrained node devices. Moreover, NDP for IPv6 networks uses 
multicast to exchange most of the protocol messages and was designed considering that routers and 
nodes are always active. Given the resource constraints of sensor nodes, the resource inefficiency 
associated to multicast based mechanisms, the low duty-cycle and multi-hop support, NDP on 
6LoWPAN networks requires a different approach. Neighbor discovery optimization for low power 
and lossy networks [6] is a work in progress at IETF 6LoWPAN working group. It proposes 
optimizations to NDP, header compression context information dissemination, auto configuration 
addressing mechanisms and duplicate address detection for low power networks. The NDP signaling 
was changed by replacing the standard address resolution mechanism (based on multicast messages 
between hosts) with an address registration mechanism. Moreover, some multicast messages 
associated to node address configuration were replaced by unicast messages, providing host-initiated 
request for router advertisements (RA) and eliminating in this way the need for periodic router 
advertisement multicasting. In this way, NDP for 6LoWPAN is more suitable for multi-hop sensor 
networks and is independent of the selected routing approach. 
The 6LBR is responsible for interconnecting the LoWPAN to the Internet and for disseminating 
IPv6 prefixes and header compression context information across the LoWPAN. The 6LBR also 
maintains a network cache of all IPv6 addresses and EUI-64 identifiers. In this way, 6LBR is able to 
make layer-two address resolution and to perform duplicate address detection (DAD). 
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Besides the Router Solicitation (RS), Router Advertisement (RA), Neighbor Solicitation (NS) and 
Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message types which were already defined for IPv6 networks, NDP for 
6LoWPAN [6] defines two new ICMPv6 message types to implement DAD on multi-hop networks: 
Duplicate Address Request (DAR) and Duplicate Address Confirmation (DAC) and some new options 
on the previous message types. 
When a 6LN interface is initialized, a link-local address is formed based on the EUI-64 [33]. Next, 
the 6LN multicasts a RS message indicating its source link-layer address. All 6LRs with direct 
connectivity reply with a unicast RA message indicating the available IPv6 prefix(es). Once an address 
has been configured, the following messages exchange is shown in Figure 2. First, a unicast NS 
message is sent to the selected 6LR to register its configured address (if 6LN receives RA messages 
from different 6LRs, it should attempt to register its address in more than one 6LN to increase the 
network resilience). Then, the 6LR sends a unicast DAR message to the 6LBR to check if the IPv6 
address is already in use and the 6LBR replies to the 6LR with a DAC message indicating the status of 
the registration. The status indicates either a successful registration or a failure due to a duplicated 
address (or any other reason like, for example, the routers registration cache exhaustion). Finally, the 
6LR sends a unicast NA message to the 6LN indicating the same status as received from the 6LBR in 
the DAC message. 
The information contained on NA messages have an associated lifetime and the address registration 
process is repeated before the lifetime expires. In this way, NS messages are also used to perform 
unreachability detection and are mainly used by nodes to verify the default router reachability. 
Figure 2. 6LoWPAN neighbor discovery address registration. 
 
NDP is not secure when physical security on the link is not guaranteed. If a malicious node knows, 
by spoofing, the link-layer and the IPv6 addresses previously registered by a legitimate node, it might 
register the same IPv6 address either with its own link-layer address or with a fictitious address. This 
vulnerability can be exploited for different types of security attacks: redirection, denial-of-service and 
flooding denial-of-service. In redirection attacks, the malicious node receives the packets and reroutes 
them (either changed or unchanged) to their legitimate node. In denial-of-service attacks, the malicious 
node prevents communications between the legitimate node and either all other nodes or some 
particular destination node. In flooding denial-of-service attacks, the malicious node redirects the 
packets from other nodes to a victim node to create on it a flood of bogus traffic. 
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Meanwhile, the secure neighbor discovery protocol (SEND) [34] was proposed for traditional IPv6 
networks to protect NDP against these attacks. The SEND protocol uses: (i) an authorization 
delegation discovery process to prove the routers’ identity, (ii) an address ownership proof mechanism 
based on cryptographically generated addresses (CGA) and (iii) digital signatures for all NDP 
messages. SEND specification uses a cryptographically generated address method to bind a RSA 
public key to an IPv6 address and to digitally sign all NDP messages. 
However, RSA is not suitable for low power and resource constrained nodes, because it is 
computationally intensive and leads to long message sizes [34]. To overcome this problem, the 
lightweight secure neighbor discovery for low-power and lossy networks work in progress 
specification (LSEND) [7] relies on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to generate the CGA and on 
elliptic curve digitally signature algorithm (ECDSA) to sign the NDP messages. In fact, elliptic curve 
cryptography can provide the same level and type of security guarantees as RSA using much shorter 
keys [34,35]. The computational overhead of both ECC and RSA raises with O(N3), where N is the bit 
length, while ECC and ECDSA lead to much smaller message sizes and lower computational load 
when compared with RSA [36]. All nodes generate a public and private key pair for each network 
interface in order to generate their own CGA addresses and to create the digital signatures [34], 
necessary to sign NDP messages. The digital signature is a hash code based on nodes private key, 
source and destination IPv6 addresses, header type protocol (8 bits), header checksum value (16 bits), 
the NDP message header (and its options) and a 128 bits constant, randomly generated and designated 
by message type tag. The ECC based algorithm used to generate CGA takes three parameters: the  
EUI-64 identifier, the public key of the interface and a three bit security parameter used to hamper 
brute force attacks. 
Note that both SEND and LSEND protocols require no public key infrastructure. Therefore, any 
node, including potential attacker nodes, may generate and register valid CGAs, but an attacker node 
cannot use a CGA previously registered by legitimate nodes, preventing in this way the previously 
described attacks. 
When a 6LN receives a RA message from a 6LR, it configures its own CGA address and launches 
the address registration process (as illustrated in Figure 2) by sending a NS message with both the 
configured address and the CGA options (i.e., the IPv6 source address of the NS message is set to its 
CGA address, the message carries the 6LN public key and it is signed with the 6LN private key). The 
6LR receives the NS message and, based on its CGA options, runs two verification steps: (1) it verifies 
the source address using the claimed IPv6 source address and (2) it runs a cryptographic check of the 
signature included in the NS message. If both steps are successful, the 6LR proceeds with the address 
registration process as previously described. In this case, the 6LBR caches not only the 6LN IPv6 
address but also its public key.  
3.3. IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks 
The IETF routing over low-power and lossy networks (RoLL) working group was chartered to 
design a routing protocol to be used in 6LoWPAN networks that addresses the requirements described 
in RFCs 5548 [37], 5673 [38], 5826 [39], and 5867 [40]. In 2010, RoLL introduced the IPv6 Routing 
Protocol for Low-power and lossy networks (RPL) [31]. 
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Currently multipoint-to-point traffic pattern is dominant, because in most LoWPAN applications a 
few nodes are used to retrieve data from sensor nodes and the sensors rarely communicate between 
each other. To support this traffic pattern, RPL builds a destination oriented directed acyclic graph 
(DODAG) to route the data traffic. RPL defines a new ICMPv6 message with three possible types: 
DODAG information object (DIO) used to transport information that allows a node to discover an RPL 
instance, learn its configuration parameters and select DODAG parents; the DODAG information 
solicitation (DIS) to request a DODAG information object from a RPL node and the destination 
advertisement object (DAO) used to propagate information upwards along the DODAG. 
During the DODAG construction and maintenance, nodes send DIO messages to their neighbors, 
carrying the objective function used to compute the rank value of each node. The rank defines the node 
relative position within a DODAG with respect to the root. The objective function specifies the metrics 
and constraints used to compute the routing path, the node rank position and the parent node set. RPL 
includes a flexible framework that incorporates dynamic routing metrics, such as expected number of 
transmissions (ETX). RPL also describes the constraints on how nodes select potential parents from 
their neighbors. For example, the node security support can be used as a constraint and, in this case, 
the nodes that do not support some security mechanism cannot be members of the DODAG. Nodes 
listen for DIO messages and use their information to join a new DODAG or to maintain an existing 
DODAG. Based on the DIO information, nodes choose parents that minimize path cost to the DODAG 
root. In the steady state, each node has a set of parents where the one with least rank value is selected 
as the preferred parent and the others are used as backup nodes. 
DIO messages only enable upward routes computation and nodes have no knowledge about their 
children. In order to support routing to other destinations within the DODAG, RPL uses DAO messages 
to inform parents of their presence and reachability to descendants. The root node gathers the DAO 
messages from all other nodes and uses them to build downward routes to all destinations. RPL also 
defines local and global repair methods for re-computing routes when some inconsistency is detected. 
Security is an important design consideration for LoWPAN networks because several attacks 
against the routing protocols were already identified. In order to guarantee the integrity of routing 
messages, RPL defines an optional cryptographic operation mode, in which advanced encryption 
mechanisms are used for message authentication. AES for message authentication and RSA signatures 
for checking the integrity of routing messages are already considered. Using ECC signatures to 
substitute RSA is possible and desirable because it provides the same security guarantees with much 
smaller keys, although the ECC inclusion is a work in progress [41]. 
3.4. Node Remote Reprogramming Mechanisms 
In the general case, wireless node reprogramming, also named over-the-air reprogramming, is a 
useful tool for remote uploading new codes or for changing the functionalities of existing codes [42]. 
Remote reprogramming is especially useful on large networks installed on harsh or difficult access 
environments. In our case, the proposed network access control framework relies on remote 
reprogramming as a means to enforce node security, i.e., to guarantee that legitimate nodes are using 
security free codes before being connected to the network.  
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Remote software installation is more challenging on LoWPAN networks mainly because of the 
resource constraints of the nodes, the fact that a single network might have thousands of nodes and the 
fact of communications being over multihop links. Moreover, a program image is relatively large to be 
transmitted over low-power wireless links where link losses and collisions often occur. Consequently, 
efficient mechanisms must be used to upload the software, minimizing the nodes energy consumption. 
Significant research has been done in order to address the resource constraints nature of LoWPAN 
networks. The first proposed reprogramming mechanisms have only assumed single-hop networks. In 
this case, only nodes with direct links with the border router (usually selected to store the new software 
because it has more resources than the other nodes) can be reprogramed. Recently, more mechanisms 
were proposed to address multi-hop reprogramming [43]. In fact, multi-hop reprogramming can be 
more efficient, both in terms of time and energy, when compared with single-hop reprogramming. 
First, shorter links can be used, which reduces the retransmissions due to collisions. Second, the  
multi-hop protocols divide the entire code image into pages and when a node completes downloading a 
single page, it can send it to other nodes in the network while downloading the next page (this process 
is referred to as spatial multiplexing). 
Remote reprogramming research is organized under the following three categories [44] (Figure 3): 
the sensor node execution environment, the protocols for update dissemination, and the image size 
reduction. Power efficiency, performance, security and reliability are common issues addressed by the 
solutions proposed for each category. 
Figure 3. Node remote reprogramming mechanisms. 
 
3.4.1. Sensor Node Execution Environment 
The execution environment is the responsible to run programs on top of the available hardware. The 
first systems had dedicated execution environments to make the best use of the available hardware 
heterogeneity. The presence of a memory management unit (MMU) can have a significant impact on 
the software update process. The MMU is the hardware component that manages virtual memory 
systems and, in most situations, it is included on the CPU chip. When the MMU is available, much of 
the code position is independent, because virtual memory addressing is used, adding safety boundaries 
to programs. Moreover, individual modules are executed as separate processes. Since processes run in 
a virtual address space, they can be easily upgraded at runtime without using references to absolute 
memory addresses. However, many of microcontrollers used on sensor nodes are not equipped with 
MMU. Without the MMU, a node operates in a single address space and, in such case, the node is 
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more vulnerable to incorrect or malicious memory references. Execution environments without MMU 
can be classified in monolithic environments, modular environments and virtual machines.  
In monolithic environments, the entire executable program is statically optimized during the 
compilation. In this case, a single system image containing both all applications and the system kernel 
is produced making efficient use of CPU and memory. The TinyOS operating system is an example of 
a monolithic execution environment. In such execution environments, a new complete image must be 
uploaded into the node, resulting in large update patches.  
In modular execution environments, individual modules can be independently loaded on demand. In 
this type of environment, the system is divided into two parts: the kernel, usually static, and the loadable 
component images, usually dynamic. The kernel provides services to the modules, such as memory 
management, I/O, and communications. The modules access the services provided by the kernel at 
predefined addresses or through a system jump table. The updates are smaller than in monolithic 
counterpart because the modules are separated from the kernel part. Moreover, the kernel part requires 
less frequent updates than in monolithic environment because it only provides the interfaces to the 
module applications. Contiki and Bertha operating systems use modular execution environments. 
Virtual machine (VM) environments are used to virtualize underlying hardware, providing  
high-level operations to applications through an instruction interpreter. VM typically executes a 
program in a sandbox where direct access to hardware is not allowed. In sensor networks, a VM 
environment also allows the implementation, by software, of some features that the hardware might 
not provide, such as the memory management unit. Unfortunately, VM introduces overhead in both 
execution time and memory resources. First, the runtime interpretation causes programs to run slower by 
at least an order of magnitude when compared with native execution. Second, the VM itself requires a 
certain fixed amount of memory to operate, and interpreted programs are generally more memory 
demanding. Several VM environments for TinyOS and Contiki operating systems were proposed, such 
as Maté and Agilla [45]. 
3.4.2. Protocols for Update Dissemination 
The proposed protocols for software update dissemination are mainly based on data dissemination 
protocols, such as RMTS [46] and direct diffusion [47]. Software dissemination protocols operate in 
three steps: (i) advertisement of available software, (ii) source selection and (iii) reliable download to 
the destination.  
Deluge is generally accepted as the state of the art for code dissemination in wireless sensor 
networks, and has been included in the latest TinyOS distributions [48]. Deluge is a reliable data 
dissemination protocol for disseminating data objects from one or more source nodes to many other 
nodes over a multihop wireless network. Data objects are represented as a set of fixed size pages to 
enable incremental updates and to allow spatial multiplexing.  
Code dissemination protocols can be used to compromise LoWPAN networks. For example, an 
attacker may attempt to modify or replace the authentic code image introducing malicious code into 
the network nodes. Code dissemination protocols can also be used to perform denial-of-service attacks, 
where the malicious node injects bogus code and force network nodes to verify and forward them 
leading to exhausting their battery power. Several recent protocols, based on Deluge, were proposed to 
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address secure code dissemination. For example, Sluice integrates cryptographic digital signatures and 
hash functions to provide authentication for code dissemination. Like Deluge, Sluice also splits code 
images into fixed size pages. The hash code of each page is included in the previous page. The hash 
code of the first page is signed and included in the packet signature. This approach solves the 
authenticity attacks, but it does not address denial-of-service attacks. Since a node can only perform 
authentication when a complete page is received, many packets must be processed before the 
authenticity can be verified. Seluge [49,50] inherits the efficiency and robustness properties from 
Deluge providing authentication mechanisms for code dissemination and protection for DoS attacks 
against signature packets, code dissemination packets and maintenance packets. Seluge uses public key 
mechanisms based on elliptic curve cryptography.  
3.4.3. Size Reduction Mechanisms 
While the dissemination protocol aims to minimize the overhead related to delivering updates, 
reducing the size of transmitted software is used to decrease the size of the updates. Three main 
techniques are used to achieve this objective: compression, differential patching and high-level 
instructions. Several reducing size mechanisms were proposed, such as: Reijers [51], Rsync [52] and 
Remote Incremental Linking [53]. Reijers reduces the image size generation differential script. The script 
is downloaded as a series of packets where each packet contains the new instruction code and its address. 
The script is applied against the currently running program stored in the external memory, usually an 
EEPROM, gradually building a new image. When this process is completed, the boot loader loads the 
new image into the running memory. The scripting language is cpu-specific, which is the Reijers 
algorithm major flaw. Rsync also provides incremental software updates but its algorithm is CPU 
independent. The Rsync script can either specify unmodified block to be copied for a new address or can 
contain modified code. The updater node asks the node being updated for the checksum of its current 
blocks and, according to the response, only sends changed code. Remote Incremental Linking was 
designed for mica2 mote hardware platform and supports dynamic and static updates. An image program 
is composed by several functions and at the end of the functions some space is reserved to allow future 
expansion. New versions of the functions can be written at the same start address memory, as long as 
they fit, without the need to update references to the functions elsewhere in the program. Otherwise, 
either adjacent functions or the new functions are moved, which minimizes page writes. 
4. Network Access Control Security Framework 
This paper proposes a network access control security framework, for 6LoWPAN networks, that 
controls the access of nodes to the network, based on administrative authorization, and enforces 
security compliance to the authorized nodes. The proposed framework can operate in two different 
modes: listening and active. In the listening mode, no security assessment and enforcement is 
performed. This mode is useful for network visibility, because it can be used to gather information 
about the connected nodes. The active mode is more secure than the listening mode because only 
security compliant nodes can be connected to the network.  
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4.1. Nodes Requirements 
In order to provide a secure and manageable solution, a few assumptions related to nodes and 
border routers must be defined, according to the selected operating mode. To operate in listening 
mode, all nodes must support 6LoWPAN and LSEND protocol. To operate in active mode, in addition 
to the previous requirements, the nodes must also support a secure reprogramming mechanism and the 
RPL routing protocol with message authentication. The secure reprogramming mechanism can be 
implemented using Seluge combined with Maté execution environment and Rsync size reduction 
mechanism. The border router must support both operating modes simultaneously and, therefore, their 
requirements are the same as the nodes when supporting the active mode. We assume that border 
routers are hard to be compromised. 
4.2. Node Identification, Compliance and Data Security 
As sensor networks are mostly deployed in human-unattended environments, usually for critical 
sensing measurements tasks, the authentication of the data source as well as the data itself is of critical 
concern. In fact, authentication guarantee can provide both sensor and router identification ability, in 
order to protect the integrity and freshness of critical data, and forbid and/or identify several security 
attacks. Traditionally, there are two schemes to provide authentication: digital signatures based on 
public-keys and message authentication code based on symmetric-keys. In the current proposal, the 
same public and private key pairwise, generated by the LSEND protocol to build the cryptographically 
generated addresses (CGA) addresses, is used to authenticate the network nodes. As aforementioned, 
the CGA are IPv6 addresses where the least 64 address bits are generated by computing a 
cryptographic one-way hash function from a public key and other auxiliary parameters. The address 
owner uses the corresponding private key to declare the address ownership and to sign the messages 
sent without a certification authority or other security infrastructure. The binding between the address 
and the public key can be confirmed by re-computing the hash value and by comparing the hash with 
the interface identifier. As a consequence, messages sent from a CGA IPv6 address can be protected 
by attaching the public key and auxiliary parameters and by signing the message with the corresponding 
private key. Every node can generate valid private and public key pairwise and the correspondent CGA 
address and, once registered in the border router, no other node can use the same address. In our 
proposal, after the LSEND registration procedure, the administrator approves manually each new node 
based on its CGA address. Once authenticated, each node is able to verify if the sender node is the 
right owner of the CGA generated source address. One of the key advantages of this approach is that, 
in addition to ensuring the identity of the sender, the same public and private pairwise can be also used 
to guarantee the authenticity, confidentiality and data freshness to all protocols or mechanisms in use.  
Traditionally, two different approaches are used to perform node security compliance. In the first 
approach, a piece of software named agent is used to perform the nodes assessment. The agent returns 
to the security enforcement point (in our case, the border router) the result of the assessment. In the 
second approach, the assessment is performed based on the traffic generated by the node under 
assessment. The security enforcement point sends requests to the node under assessment and the 
evaluation is made based on the responses. Usually, the first approach returns more accurate results 
Sensors 2013, 13 1224 
 
 
than the second approach. Moreover, the second approach is more verbose than the first one, because 
multiple messages are exchanged. The current proposal adopts the agent based assessment approach. 
The agent can be previously installed on the nodes and the assessment is based on cryptographic hash 
of the installed software. If the agent is not installed, we assume that the node is not compliant and a 
new image, which includes the assessment agent, will be uploaded by the reprogramming mechanism 
on the fly. The hardware configuration can also be evaluated during the assessment, although this feature 
is not considered in our solution. Note that any solution to perform nodes security assessment is very 
dependent on the operating system and the hardware used in the network devices. So, different agent 
versions might be required if different operating systems or hardware platforms are to be used. The border 
router can use operating system fingerprinting in order to determine which agent version has to be used. 
4.3. Access Control Algorithm Description  
The access control algorithm of our proposal assumes that each node is always in one of seven 
states: new node, pending, assessment, image update, update assessment, authorized and malicious. 
Figure 4 illustrates the decision process from the initial ‘new node’ state until one of the final states is 
reached, which is either ‘authorized’ or ‘malicious’. 
Figure 4. Access control decision process. 
 
The 6LoWPAN nodes can use link layer detection mechanisms and/or router advertisement 
messages to detect new networks. If a new network is detected, the 6LoPWAN nodes must use 
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LSEND protocol to perform the address registration process, as described in section 3.2. The address 
registration process is used to detect new nodes presence. In the listening mode, the automatic approval 
is in use and, therefore, the new node moves to the authorized state and its address is added to the 
border router as a registered entry [6]. This is the less secure operation mode and is used by the 
administrator to determine which nodes are connected. 
In the active mode, the automatic approval is not set and, therefore, the new node moves to the 
pending state and its address is stored in the border router neighbor cache as a tentative entry [6]. 
Before the authorized state is reached, only messages related to the assessment, image deployment and 
authorization are allowed. In the pending state, the administrator can classify the new node as 
malicious if: (i) additional nodes are not expected, (ii) the administrator does not rely on the received 
information or (iii) the new node was considered malicious in the past. If the administrator does not 
consider the new node as malicious, the next step is to verify if the assessment agent is installed. If yes, 
the node moves to the assessment state and its security compliance is evaluated. Then, the node transits 
to the authorized state if the evaluation is successful or to the malicious state, otherwise. If the 
assessment agent is not installed, the node moves to the image update state, where the border router 
tries to install on the node a new image using Deluge (the new image includes the operating system, 
the assessment agent and all required modules). If the configuration of the new image is refused by the 
node, if moves to the malicious state. Otherwise, the node moves to the update assessment state and its 
security compliance is evaluated. Then, the node transits to the authorized state if the evaluation is 
successful or to the malicious state, otherwise. 
When a node is moved to the malicious state, its address is marked as garbage-collectible in the 
border router neighbor cache, the address is propagated by the RPL messages to all authorized nodes 
as a restriction, and the address is pruned from all nodes RPL candidate neighbor list and cannot 
belong to the DODAG instance in use. So, in the malicious state, no messages from these nodes are 
processed or forwarded by any other LoWPAN node. 
5. Discussion 
The security research applied to LoWPAN networks is considered by the industry and by the 
research community a very hot topic. Several security mechanisms were proposed, some of them to 
address some particular scenarios, application and protocols. Besides protecting the network from 
some well-known threats, it is important that security mechanisms can withstand to attacks that have 
not been identified before. Therefore, the challenge is on how can the attackers explore vulnerabilities 
that have not been yet identified. The control of which nodes can take part of the network and their 
security compliance can help to reduce several vulnerabilities, making the network more manageable, 
while increasing its reliability and extending its lifetime. The proposed security framework proposal 
can be used to achieve these objectives, in particular to make the network more resilient to internal 
attacks. First, network assessment control restricts the network access only to authorized nodes. 
Second, node security compliance is enforced before node can access to the network. Finally, beyond 
to security compliance assessment, the software image can also be checked in order to guarantee that 
node is able to realize the expected functions. Therefore, only authorized nodes that fulfill security and 
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functions requirements are accepted. This is particularly relevant if multi-hop networks are used. Node 
authorization depends on: 
• Administrator authorization: a manual authorization was considered because it is very hard 
to define rules that can be applied to all network security requirements. For example, in a 
monitoring network installed in a nuclear power plant, if a new node tries to access the 
network, it will be most probably a malicious node since the network infrastructure remains 
unchanged for long time periods. Therefore, the administrator can approve the new nodes 
based on: hardware type, layer-two address and location. This approval method also protects 
the framework against DoS attacks, because only approved nodes will be evaluated. All 
nodes are identified by a cryptographic generated address, according to LSEND protocol.  
• Security check compliance: several conditions can be considered as inputs to the agent used 
to assess the security compliance such as, for example, the installed software image and the 
security protocols in use. Note that multiple agents might be required if different operating 
systems or hardware platforms are used in the same network. The decision on which agent 
should be used on each device node is a challenge. 
• Hardware and software image compliance: providing plug-and-play mechanism is not 
enough to guarantee that node is able to realize the desired functions. For example, a sensor 
node is unable to monitor the temperature if the module used to retrieve the temperature is 
missing. The same occurs with the hardware. Software image compliance also helps to 
protect against malicious code injection. 
The proposed framework also improves the network manageability, since remote software installation is 
supported. The implementation success of the proposed security framework depends on the ability to 
integrate the above described mechanisms and protocols in order to take advantage of synergies between 
them. In fact, the following modifications are required in order to maximize the integration benefits. 
LSEND requires the addition of a secure mechanism to inform nodes that a neighbor must be 
removed from its neighbor cache in order to avoid communications between authorized nodes and 
malicious nodes. It is also necessary to define a data structure to share the ECC key pairwise generated 
by the LSEND protocol with the RPL routing protocol and remote image installation mechanism. Note 
that the ECC key pairwise can also be used to protect the application layer data exchange, in order to 
guarantee data authentication and authenticity. In fact, the reutilization of the same ECC private and 
public key pairwise between several protocols and mechanisms simplifies the operations related to the 
key management [25]. The key pairwise reutilization also extends the network lifetime because fewer 
messages are used when compared with other solutions that use one key for each protocol or 
mechanism. In fact, the transmission energy consumption rate, in wireless sensor networks can be over 
three orders of magnitude greater than the energy consumption rates for computing [54]. 
In the RPL protocol, the ECC support must be defined in order to protect the routing messages 
exchange. Also, an efficient mechanism must be defined in order to propagate efficiently addresses as 
a constraint in order to avoid the malicious nodes to participate in the routing tree. 
Concerning node remote reprogramming mechanisms, several mechanisms must be combined to 
enable node remote reprogramming. These mechanisms are very dependent on the operating system 
and the hardware in use. As a consequence, it is foreseen that early implementations of the proposed 
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framework in real deployment scenarios will support node remote reprogramming mechanism only for 
a few hardware platforms and operating systems. Currently, a laboratory testbed is being implemented 
where the above-mentioned protocol modifications are being conducted and integrated aiming to 
validate the proposed security framework. 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
Improving the security is critical for the success of LoWPAN networks, because these types of 
networks are particularly vulnerable, they are used in critical services and the data collected is often 
sensitive. Several security solutions were proposed, most of them designed to address known attacks 
and implemented on particular layers. Several security attacks can be avoided if a network access 
control mechanism is used to restrict the network access only to authorized nodes which are compliant 
with the defined security requirements. This paper, we have proposed a network access control 
framework that can be used to accomplish these objectives. The proposed solution enables the node 
identification based on cryptographically generated addresses, node security compliance evaluation 
and node remediation with secure remote software installation. This solution is mainly based on the 
following open protocols: LSEND, used to secure neighbor discovery and node secure identification, 
RPL with ECC support, to protect the routing messages and Seluge, to enable secure remote software 
installation. In the current proposal, synergies between the protocols were taken in consideration. 
Work is still required to improve and integrate these protocols in order to create a solution. Moreover, 
the current proposal only enables one border router. As a consequence, when the border router 
becomes unreachable, all nodes must be approved and evaluated. Further research is required to 
circumvent this limitation since a secure mechanism is required to synchronize the ECC keys and 
nodes authorization state between multiple border routers. Besides the current lab implementation to 
validate our current proposal, this research is another direction of our future work.  
Acknowledgments 
This work has been partially supported by the Instituto de Telecomunicações, Next Generation 
Networks and Applications Group (NetGNA), Portugal, by National Funding from the  
FCT — Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia through the Pest-OE/EEI/LA0008/2011, by the 
AAL4ALL project (Ambient Assisted Living for All), co-funded by COMPETE under FEDER via 
QREN Programme, and by the LOPIX QREN Project. 
References 
1. Kushalnagar, N.; Montenegro, G.; Schumacher, C. IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area 
Networks (6LoWPANs): Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals, RFC 4919; 
2007. Available online: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4919.txt (accessed on 27 August 2012). 
2. Oliveira, L.M.L.; Sousa, A.F.; Rodrigues, J.R. Routing and mobility approaches in IPv6 over 
LoWPAN mesh networks. Int. J. Commun. Syst. 2011, 24, 1445–1466. 
3. Gershenfeld, N.; Krikorian, R.; Cohen, D. The internet of things. Sci. Am. 2004, 4, 76–81. 
4. Hui, J.; Culler, D. Extending IP to low-power, wireless personal area networks. IEEE Internet 
Comput. 2008, 4, 37–45. 
Sensors 2013, 13 1228 
 
 
5. Narten, T.; Nordmark, E.; Simpson, W.; Soliman, H. Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6), 
RFC 4861; 2007. Available online: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4861.txt (accessed on 27 August 2012). 
6. Shelby, Z.; Chakrabarti, S.; Nordmark E. Neighbor Discovery Optimization for Low Power and 
Lossy Networks; Draft−ietf−6lowpan−nd−21; 2012; unpublished work. 
7. Sarikaya, B.; Xia F.; Zaverucha, G. Lightweight Secure Neighbor Discovery for Low-Power and 
Lossy Networks; Draft-sarikaya-6lowpan-cgand-03; 2012; unpublished work. 
8. Yong, W.; Attebury, G.; Ramamurthy B. A survey of security issues in wireless sensor networks. 
IEEE Commun. Surv. Tut. 2006, 8, 2–23. 
9. Oliveira, L.; Rodrigues, J.; Sousa, A.; Lloret, J. Denial of service mitigation approach for  
IPv6-enabled smart object networks. Concurr. Comp.-Pract. E. 2013, 25, 129–142. 
10. Du, X.; Chen, H. Security in wireless sensor networks. IEEE Wirel. Commun. 2008, 15, 60–66. 
11. Pelechrinis, K.; Iliofotou, M.; Krishnamurthy, V. Denial of service attacks in wireless networks: 
The Case of Jammers. IEEE Commun. Surv. Tut. 2011, 13, 245–257. 
12. Lopez, J.; Roman, E.; Alcaraz, C. Analysis of security threats, requirements, technologies and 
standards in wireless sensor network. Lect. Notes Comput. Sci. 2009, 5705, 289–338. 
13. Kavitha, T.; Sridharan, D. Security vulnerabilities in wireless sensor networks: A survey. J. Inf. 
Assur. Secur. 2010, 5, 31–44. 
14. Faye, Y.; Niang, I.; Noel, T. A survey of access control schemes in wireless sensor networks. 
Proc. World Acad. Sci. Eng. Tech. 2011, 59, 814–823. 
15. Sun, K.; Liu, A.; Xu, R.; Ning, P.; Maughan, D. Securing Network Access in Wireless Sensor 
Networks. In WiSec ’09 Proceedings of the Second ACM Conference on Wireless Network 
Security; ACM: New York, NY, USA, 2009. 
16. Shi, E.; Perrig, A. Designing secure sensor networks. IEEE Wirel. Commun 2004, 11, 38–43. 
17. Ramen, R.; Lopez, J.; Gritzalis, S. Situation awareness mechanisms for wireless sensor networks. 
IEEE Comm. Mag. 2008, 46, 102–107. 
18. Sakerindr, P.; Ansari, N. Security Services in Group Communications over wireless 
infrastructure, mobile Ad Hoc and sensor networks. IEEE Wirel. Commun. 2007, 14, 8–20. 
19. Singh, S.K.; Singh, M.P.; Singhtise, D.K. A survey on network security and attack defense 
mechanism for wireless sensor networks. Int. J. Comput. Trends Tech. 2011, 5–6, 1–9. 
20. Khan, M.K.; Alghathbar, K. Cryptanalysis and security improvements of ‘two-factor user 
authentication in wireless sensor networks’. Sensors 2010, 10, 2450–2459. 
21. Xiao, Y.; Rayi, V.K.; Sun, B.; Du, X.;, Hu, F.; Galloway, M. A survey of key management 
schemes in wireless sensor networks. Comput. Commun. 2007, 30, 2314–2341. 
22. Wood, A.; Fang L.; Stankovic, J., He, T. SIGF: a family of configurable, secure routing protocols 
for wireless sensor networks. In SASN ’06 Proceedings of the Fourth ACM Workshop on Security 
of Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks; ACM: New York, NY, USA, 2006; pp. 35–48. 
23. Alzaid, H.; Foo E.; Gonzalez N.J. Secure Data Aggregation in Wireless Sensor Network: A 
Survey. In AISC ’08 Proceedings of the Sixth Australasian Conference on Information Security; 
Brankovic, L., Miller, M., Eds.; Australian Computer Society, Inc.: Darlinghurst, Australia, 2008; 
Volume 81, pp. 93–105. 
24. Sun, K.; Ning, P.; Wang, C. Fault-tolerant cluster-wise clock synchronization for wireless sensor 
networks. IEEE Trans. Depend. Secure. 2005, 2, 177–189. 
Sensors 2013, 13 1229 
 
 
25. Yong, W.; Ramamurthy, B.; Xue, Y.; Zou, X. A security Framework for Wireless Sensor 
Networks Utilizing a Unique Session Key. In Proceedings of Broadband Communications, 
Networks and Systems, London, UK, 8–11 September 2008; pp. 487–494. 
26. Perrig, A.; Szewczyk, R.; Tygar, J.D.; Wen, V.; Culler, D. SPINS: Security protocols for sensor 
networks. Wirel. Netw. 2001, 8, 521–534. 
27. Zia, T.A.; Zomaya, A.Y. A lightweight security framework for wireless sensor networks.  
J. Wirel. Mobile Netw., Ubiquitous Comput. Dependable Appl. (JoWUA) 2011, 2, 53–73. 
28. Gura, N.; Patel, A.; Wander, A.; Eberle, H.; Chang-Shantz, S. Comparing Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography and RSA on 8-bit CPUs. In Proceedings of CHES ’2004 Workshop on 
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems-Lecture Notes in Computer Science;  
Springer-Verlag: Cambridge, MA, USA, 2004. 
29. Ortal, A.; Qi, H. Load balanced key establishment methodologies in wireless sensor networks.  
Int. J. Secur. Netw. 2006, 1, 158–166. 
30. Montenegro, G.; Kushalnagar, N.; Hui, J.; Culler, D. Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 
802.15.4 Networks, RFC 4944; 2007. Available online: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4944.txt 
(accessed on 25 August 2012). 
31. Winter, T.; Thubert, P.; Brandt, A.; Hui, J.; Kelsey, R.; Levis, P.; Pister, K.; Struik, R.;  
Vasseur, JP.; Alexander, R. RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks, RFC 
6550; 2012. Available online: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6550.txt (accessed on 25 August 2012). 
32. Thomson, S.; Narten, T.; Jinmei, T. IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration, RFC 4862; 2007. 
Available online: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4862.txt (accessed on 25 August 2012). 
33. Hinden, R.; Deering, S. IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture, RFC 4291; 2006. Available online: 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4291.txt (accessed on 25 August 2012). 
34. Arkko, J.; Kempf, J.; Sommerfeld, B.; Zill, B.; Nikander, P. SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND), 
RFC 3971; 2005. Available online: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3971.txt (accessed on 25 August 2012). 
35. Driessen, B.; Poschmann, A.; Paar, C. Comparison of Innovative Signature Algorithms for WSNs. 
In WiSec ’08 Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security; ACM:  
New York, NY, USA; pp. 30–35. 
36. Rongbo, Z.; Ya, M. Research on Key Management Scheme for WSN Based on ECC. In 
Information Engineering and Applications; Zhu, R., Ma, Y., Eds.; Springer: London, UK, 2012; 
Volume 153, pp. 219–216. 
37. Dohler, M.; Watteyne, T.; Winter, T.; Barthel, D. Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power 
and Lossy Networks, RFC 5548; 2009. Available online: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5548.txt 
(accessed on 25 August 2012). 
38. Pister, K.; Thubert, P.; Dwars, S.; Phinney, T. Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and 
Lossy Networks, RFC 5673; 2009. Available online: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5673.txt (accessed 
on 25 August 2012). 
39. Brandt, A.; Buron, J.; Porcu, G. Home Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and 
Lossy Networks, RFC 5826; 2010. Available online: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5826.txt (accessed 
on 25 August 2012). 
40. Martocci, J.; Mi, P.D.; Riou, N.; Vermeylen, W. Building Automation Routing Requirements in 
Low Power and Lossy Networks, RFC 5867; 2010. Available online: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/ 
rfc5867.txt (accessed on 25 August 2012). 
Sensors 2013, 13 1230 
 
 
41. Ko, K.; Dawson-Haggerty, S.; Hui, J.; Culler, D.; Levis, P.; Terzis, A. Connecting low-power and 
lossy networks to the Internet. IEEE Commun. Mag. 2011, 49, 96–101. 
42. Mottola, L.; Pietro, G. Programming wireless sensor networks: Fundamental concepts and state of 
the art. ACM Comput. Surv. 2011, 43, 1–51. 
43. Hui, J.; Culler, D. The Dynamic Behavior of a Data Dissemination Protocol for Network 
Programming at Scale. In SenSys ’04 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on 
Embedded Networked Sensor Systems; ACM: New York, NY, USA, 2004; pp. 81–94. 
44. Brown, S.; Sreenan, J. Updating Software in Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey; Tech. Rep. 
UCC-CS-2006-13-07; Department of Computer Science, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland, 
2006. 
45. Levis, P.; Culler, D. Maté: A Tiny Virtual Machine for Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of the 
10th International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and 
Operating Systems, San Jose, CA, USA, 5–9 October 2002. 
46. Stann, F.; Heidemann, J. RMST: Reliable Data Transport in Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of 
the First IEEE International Workshop on Sensor Network Protocols and Applications, 
Anchorage, AK, USA, 11 May 2003. 
47. Intanagonwiwat, C.; Govindan, R.; Estrin, D.; Heidemann, J.; Silva, F. Directed diffusion for 
wireless sensor networking. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 2011, 11, 2–16.  
48. Hui, J.; Culler, D. The Dynamic Behavior of a Data Dissemination Protocol for network 
Programming at Scale. In Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Embedded 
Networked Sensor Systems, Baltimore, MD, USA, 3–5 November 2004. 
49. Hyun, S.; Ning, P.; Liu, A.; Du, W. Seluge: Secure and DoS-Resistant Code Dissemination in 
Wireless Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Information 
Processing in Sensor Networks, St. Louis, MO, USA, 22–24 April 2008. 
50. TinyOS Community. Deluge T2-TinyOS Documentation Wiki. 16 March 2010. Available online: 
http://docs.tinyos.net/tinywiki/index.php/Deluge_T2 (accessed on 1 September 2012). 
51. Reijers, N.; Langendoen, K. Efficient Code Distribution in Wireless Sensor Networks. In WSNA 
’03 Proceedings of the 2nd ACM International Conference on Wireless Sensor Networks and 
Applications; ACM: New York, NY, USA, 2003. 
52. Jeong, J. Incremental Network Programming for Wireless Sensors. In Proceedings of 1st Annual 
IEEE Communications Society Conference on Sensor and Ad Hoc Networks and Communications 
(SECON 2004), Santa Clara, CA, USA, 4–7 October 2004. 
53. Koshy, J.; Pandey, R. Remote Incremental Linking for Energy-Efficient Reprogramming of 
Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of the Second European Workshop on Wireless Sensor 
Networks, Istanbul, Turkey, 31 January–2 February 2005. 
54. Carman, D.; Kruus, S.; Matt, B. Constraints and Approaches for Distributed Sensor Network 
Security; NAI Labs Technical Report #00-010; September 2000. 
© 2013 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/). 
